
JUST
HOW MUCH OF AN AML PROGRAM
DO YOU REALLY NEED?
By
Michael Riess--Transcript of a talk to IPMI Metro Chapter, 2004
In this talk, I’ll first describe the
regulatory backdrop to the anti-money laundering (AML) regulations.
Then I’ll get into specific programs that your company may—or may
not—need.
I.
Regulatory Setting
The Treasury Department had a single
underlying philosophy when it formulated the AML regulations for precious metals
and stones. The provisional
regulations of the USA PATRIOT Act say:
The general
nature of the requirement reflects Congress' intent that each financial
institution have the flexibility to tailor its program to fit its business,
taking into account factors such as size, location, activities, and risks
or vulnerabilities to money laundering.
That is, one size does not fit all.
On the surface, this seems like a sensible approach because companies in
our industry vary tremendously. The
act lets you decide how comprehensive a program you need to detect and prevent
money laundering. You have to make
those decisions based on the money-laundering and terrorist finance threats you
think you face.
But there’s a major problem here: if
you find yourself unwittingly involved in a money-laundering scheme or if the
law enforcement bodies determine you have not taken the compliance steps you
should, you will be at a severe disadvantage.
Because the Government has the benefit of hindsight and years of
practical investigative experience—and you don’t.
And if your program underestimated your money-laundering risks, you could
be seen as operating irresponsibly, or worse, as being willfully blind.
The penalties for willful blindness are the same as if you were
complicit: as much as $1 million and
20 years per count, along with forfeiture of assets.
Even if you have no money-laundering problem, you could be subject to
civil penalties for administrative non-compliance. You have the flexibility as
to your program; the agencies have the options on how the regulations are
enforced.
And enforcement is likely to be rigorous.
Bill Reid of the Department of Homeland Security, made the point loud and
clear at the National Conference: Our
job is to catch criminals and bring them to trial. He repeated it half a dozen
times in case any of us missed the point.
Why
a comprehensive program?
So, it’s important to establish AML programs
that lean toward being more comprehensive rather than less.
The reasons are:
- Severe
consequences for missteps
- Government
policy and practice.
- Industry
record
- Risk
profile of our companies.
Consequences
of involvement. The main
risk for most of us is to be caught up in a scheme as an unwitting participant.
That is, because you inadvertently happen to do business with a
launderer:
 | Your
bank accounts could be subpoenaed, frozen, seized or forfeited. |
 | Your
metal could be confiscated |
 | You
might have to open your books or submit records as part of an investigation |
 | Your
premises could be searched |
 | You
and your staff might be interviewed by a Federal enforcement officers, or |
 | You
might be asked to continue your involvement to help gather evidence. |
 | And
you might see a picture of yourself in your local paper and a really awkward
feature article about your company. |
Forfeiture law can be extremely difficult.
The law provides that all assets belonging to a money launderer and
acquired during a reasonable timeframe can be considered the product of
laundering and subject to seizure and forfeiture.
So if you bought from a launderer, even innocently, you were buying goods
acquired illegally and therefore subject to forfeiture.
It’s like buying stolen goods. And
in an industry such as ours, where leverage is so important, losing liquidity
while you scramble to prove your innocence can be harsh.
If an enforcement agency seizes your assets as proceeds of illicit
activity, the agency will receive some or all of the proceeds.
This is a strong incentive for aggressive enforcement.
The quality of your AML program will play a determining role as to whether
you retrieve confiscated goods and how much you get back.
You’ll need to show that you followed the law, you implemented a sound
AML program, you adhered to it conscientiously—and despite all that you became
an innocent victim.
The
Government.
To make your career in anti-money laundering, the name of the game is
banks, brokerage firms, insurance companies and exchange houses and that’s
where the focus is. Riggs bank has
given agents exposure and made careers; nobody except us knows about Jamie Ross.
When Government enforcement agents accustomed to dealing in financial
services are assigned to investigate precious metals problems, they bring their
financial services experience and standards with them.
With a few exceptions, agents I have spoken with assume that the same
rigorous requirements that apply to the financial services industry also apply
to us. The field agents have
tremendous power and discretion, so fair or not, we are likely to be measured by
the same yardstick as the financial services companies.
The
industry.
Given our size, why didn’t we slide under the Government’s radar?
The reason is that enough companies have been really bad actors, to the
point that talented federal agents and prosecutors have been re-directed from
traditional financial service companies to our tiny pond.
A surprising number of us have had difficult encounters with anti-money
laundering enforcement authorities. The
first big enforcement operation after money laundering became illegal in 1986
was Polar Cap. The Polar Cap cases
involved jewelers, precious metals refiners, traders and bankers.
You probably knew some—Richard Ferris, Steven Saccocia, the Andonians,
Raoul Vivas, Aharon Sharir, Joseph Mollicone.
They were among 40 people convicted.
Sharir introduced the Russian mob onto
47th Street
, in what became the Cocaine Triangle, and we’ve had a series of problems ever
since. Jamie Ross is the most
recent. He is one of twenty-three
were convicted in a recent crack-down. Twenty-four
were indicted, but Eduard Nektalov
was shot in May near
47th Street
before he could testify.
The companies.
For companies that fall under the regs but have zero money-laundering or
terrorist finance exposure, the enemy is sometimes seen not as the criminals but
the Government, which is forcing compliance with regulations that divert
management and add to overhead to prevent a non-existent threat.
But there are very few situations so straightforward and risk free in our
industry. Let me show you what I
mean with an example:
This is how the owner of a dental alloy manufacturer described his company
to me. “It’s
simple.” The company sells
precious-metals alloys containing well over 50% precious metals, and its sales
are far in excess of $50,000 a year. True.
But most of our sales are to small dental labs, with only a handful of
sales a month over $10,000.” It
looked like a candidate for a program with little or no money-laundering risk.
But the precious metals industry is entrepreneurial and finds creative
enhancements and incremental businesses to add to the bottom line.
So things are seldom what they seem.
For instance, our dental alloy manufacturer:
 | Has
a melt/assay operation for scrap. |
 | Sends
the refining lots to a non-U.S. refiner—that is, one that has no AML
program. |
 | Buys
fine metal and hedges some of its outturn with
U.S.
and non-U.S. dealers. |
 | Operates
pool accounts. |
 | Has
heavy sales staff turnover. |
 | Has
a foreign subsidiary. |
 | Accepts
cash payments and sometimes pays cash for fine metal. |
 | Exchanges
gold coins and medallions for scrap. |
 | Makes
third-party money transfers. |
There’s nothing necessarily wrong about any of this.
But it changes the company’s risk profile from a simple no-risk
scenario to one in which there is quite a lot going on in money-laundering
exposure. It underscores the
importance of analyzing money-laundering risk correctly because all your AML
programs depend on it.
II.
AML
Requirements and programs.
Some programs, you have to have by law.
Others are desirable because they could help you detect and prevent money
laundering. And there are others
that you’ll find just don’t fit your company.
- AML
Compliance Officer: On
this you have no choice. The law
requires you appoint a senior manager to the position.
- ACAMS
Certification: Every
decent-sized financial service company I know has an AML Compliance Officer
that has passed the Association of Certified Anti-Money laundering
Specialist (ACAMS) exam and become certified.
For those of us that advise others, it should be the minimum
standard. For those of you that
are interested in acting as external auditors, it’s a must, not only to
establish your credentials but to limit liability.
For companies that deal routinely with enforcement officers, it’s a
good way to show serious commitment in dealing with money-laundering
problems.
Do you need it? For larger
companies with several divisions, certification is probably a good idea.
For companies with a single plant or office, I’d say the benefit
doesn’t justify the time and expense.
- Risk
Assessment Program: To
design and build an AML program, you need to analyze your risk to money
laundering. You should update
that analysis regularly to set benchmarks as your company changes.
Risk profile can change
for many reasons:
- Your
procedures improve
- You
take on a major new customer
- You
move.
- You
make an acquisition.
Ideally, a risk
assessment program should be in the form of software for easy comparison.
It should have a built in scoring system.
Systematic scoring is absolutely essential for an objective, unbiased
consistent picture, especially in programs that are meant to be used repeatedly.
Who can benefit most from a program like this?
Companies that are growing or changing and need a barometer to signal a
shift in their money-laundering exposure. It’s
a necessary marker for management status reports.
At the same time, it should give senior management a straightforward way
to keep tabs on the AML Compliance Officer.
- AML
Written Plan:
The law requires all of us to have written AML plans laying out the
standards to which we intend to adhere and the procedures we intend to
follow.
In our industry, no two refiners, no two manufacturers, no two fabricators,
no two traders are alike. And as
to the difference between refiners and, say, fabricators—forget about it.
There are templates you can download, for instance for securities
broker-dealers. If you followed
them, you’d be committing to too much—which is expensive.
Those designed for small manufacturers or retailers would have you
doing too little—which is dangerous. So,
unless you know the law, the regulations, the industry and how your company
fits, basing your program on a one-size-fits-all solution is risky.
What we do is:
- Spend
time reviewing and analyzing your company.
- Write
a draft for discussion.
- Prepare
a final written version.
- Afterwards,
we adapt the plan to changes in your company.
- And
we send you updates as laws, regulations, court decisions and
interpretations change.
- Customer
ID Program: The law
requires that you know the identity of your customer.
That can be complicated because, again, one size doesn’t fit all.
Financial service companies have to comply with certain
know-your-customer (Section 326) standards; for us, it depends on our
exposure to money laundering.
The Government tracks identity
by name, address, citizenship or residency, date of birth or formation and
social security or tax ID number. It’s
reasonable that the Government will expect you to have that information.
If you feel you have a good grasp on a business’ ID with just that
information, and depending on the number of your customers, you don’t have
to look beyond the corporation. Naturally,
you need to have a contact person and you have to know the authorized
parties.
But remember, if you have a problem and if the Government, with benefit of
hindsight, determines your customer information was inadequate, you will be
vulnerable. If your customers are
large or in suspect locations, or present other special risks, you’ll have to
do more.
You’ll need to know the beneficial owner, and you might have to collect
information about officers, directors and even some shareholders.
You’ll have to verify the information, and you’ll also have to check
for missing or expired documents and maintain the account files.
The extent of information you collect to know your customer is up to you.
At that point, you’ll need a customer ID program with data base and a search
engine to manage the information.
Another more clear-cut threshold is pool accounts.
Treasury regards pool accounts as quasi-banking operations.
So in the next round of regulations, if you offer pool account services,
you will have to have a formal customer ID program.
If you plan to acquire a company or be acquired, the customers will all be
considered new. If they haven’t
been documented and verified, they’ll probably have to be.
And they will certainly have to be documented if you are selling or
buying a customer list.
Treasury can require you to produce records and documents to check your due
diligence. Unlike financial services
companies, if you run across what might be suspicious activity, you do not have
to report it, but you are encouraged to do so.
If you don’t report, you should certainly document the incident as part
of your customer identification program to avoid allegations of willful
blindness after the fact.
- Accounting/Metal
Control System: I’m
not about to suggest that you change your accounting and control systems to
accommodate an AML program. But
if you plan to install a new control system, you can build AML features into
it with very efficient results.
New integrated
systems can be customized to establish security procedures and prevent people
from bypassing them. They are
a big step to stopping criminals from taking advantage of the accounting system.
- Government
Lists—of money-launderers and terrorist financiers: You’re
supposed to check new customers against various bad guy lists to make sure
you aren’t dealing with a known launderer or terrorist.
The lists, especially the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) list, can
be voluminous, with pages of AKA’s and aliases.
The only effective way to review them is by search engine that
consolidates the different lists of individuals and countries.
If there is a match between a list and your customer, it’s important to
know which list. If your
customer is on the OFAC list, you must stop doing business with that person
or company, block and escrow the funds, and notify law enforcement.
That’s because the Federal Government has sanctioned those
entities.
Other lists don’t require that you stop but do require that, if you find a
match, you treat listed companies as red flags.
Another consideration is that the OFAC list covers only non-U.S.
companies and individuals. Other
lists include
U.S.
entities
- Training:
Launderers depend heavily
on employee collusion, so training is your first line of defense.
It’s the best way to prevent casual involvement.
And the law requires everyone to have a training program.
Training courses for sales persons and staff dealing with customers should
detail what money laundering is; the USA PATRIOT Act’s scope and
regulations; consequences of violation; red flags; filing suspicious
activity reports and cash transaction reports; responding to Government
enforcement agencies and other basic subjects.
The AML Compliance Officer and responsible senior executives and Board
members need more detailed training and should an advanced course.
The Act also has a continuing education requirement.
It’s important to document your staff’s training, so courses should
include confirmation that the course was completed.
Courses can be face to face or completed interactively on line.
- Audit:
The law requires you to test your AML systems.
The auditor has to be independent—either an external auditor or
someone inside the company not involved in the day-to-day administration of
your AML program.
Systems testing confirms that you are implementing the commitments you made
in your AML Written Plan (Item 3). That’s
why it is vital that your plan does not commit to more than you can do—or
less than you should.
The audit program should be specialized in precious metals, because
financial services companies have quite different requirements.
It should an efficient roadmap for auditors, detailing topics to
cover and questions to ask. The
program should take the auditor through the testing process, providing
guidelines and prompts for work papers, comments, extended analysis and
conclusions. The program should include a management letter.
And, of course, a scoring system to evaluate the company’s AML
systems and management’s response to the auditor’s suggestions.
Ideally, it should be in electronic form, with drop-down menu’s and
ample textboxes for descriptions and analyses.
Materials Management Co.’s Patriot Group
Task Force is the only company that offers a full line of comprehensive programs
and services to the precious metals and jewelry industry.
You can learn more about these programs on our website at, www.materialsmanagement.net.
The web site also features a comprehensive glossary of AML terms and
acronyms, a copy of the provisional USA PATRIOT Act regulations, and of articles
on the subject. Or call me, Mike
Riess, at (203) 661-6715.